Summary 17 18
Studies in multiple species have revealed the existence of neural signals that lawfully 19 co-vary with different aspects of the decision-making process, including choice, 20 sensory evidence that supports the choice, and reaction time. These signals, often 21
interpreted as the representation of a decision variable (DV), have been identified in 22 several motor preparation circuits and provide insight about mechanisms underlying 23 the decision-making process. However, single-trial dynamics of this process or its 24 representation at the neural population level remain poorly understood. Here, we 25 examine the representation of the DV in simultaneously recorded neural populations 26 of dorsal premotor (PMd) and primary motor (M1) cortices of monkeys performing a 27 random dots direction discrimination task with arm movements as the behavioral 28 report. We show that single-trial DVs covary with stimulus difficulty in both areas but 29 are stronger and appear earlier in PMd compared to M1 when the stimulus duration is 30 fixed and predictable. When temporal uncertainty is introduced by making the 31 stimulus duration variable, single-trial DV dynamics are accelerated across the board 32 and the two areas become largely indistinguishable throughout the entire trial. These 33 effects are not trivially explained by the faster emergence of motor kinematic signals 34
in PMd and M1. All key aspects of the data were replicated by a computational 35 model that relies on progressive recruitment of units with stable choice-related 36 modulation of neural population activity. In contrast with several recent results in 37 rodents, decision signals in PMd and M1 are not carried by short sequences of activity 38
in non-overlapping groups of neurons but are instead distributed across many 39 neurons, which once recruited, represent the decision stably during individual 40 behavioral epochs of the trial. 41 42 Introduction 43 44
When navigating in traffic, a driver constantly integrates evidence about the outside 45 world that must inform upcoming decisions: stay on the throttle, press the brake, 46 switch gears, etc. This process of deliberating on available sensory evidence to reach 47 a commitment to a specific proposition or action is termed perceptual decision-48
making Summerfield, 2017, Brody and Hanks, 2016, Murakami and 49 Mainen, 2015, Shadlen and Kiani, 2013, Gold and Shadlen, 2007) . In the driver 50 example, the actions involve limb movements, and in such contexts, primary motor 51 cortex (M1) and dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) are thought to be involved in the 52 decision-making process ( 1988, Wise et al., 1997) . In particular, lesion (Passingham, 1985) , inactivation 55 Hoffman, 1994, Sasaki and Gemba, 1986 ) and electrophysiological 56 studies (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005, Song and McPeek, 2010, Hoshi, 2013) suggest an 57 important role for PMd and M1 in action selection and visuomotor association. 58
Recent studies have employed more sophisticated perceptual discrimination tasks 59
with arm movements as the operant response (Thura and Cisek, 2014, 60 Chandrasekaran et al., , Coallier et al., 2015 and shown that firing rates of a 61 diverse neural population in PMd covaries with choice, stimulus difficulty, and 62 reaction time (RT) well before the movement onset. These results are consistent with 63 a role for PMd and M1 in "somatomotor" decisions and also suggest the presence of a 64 candidate DV, organized by cortical laminae, in these brain areas ( about the single-trial dynamics and spatiotemporal structure of neural population 75 responses in perceptual decision formation in PMd and M1. We therefore trained 76 macaque monkeys to perform fixed as well as variable-duration random-dot motion 77 direction discrimination tasks using an arm movement as the 78 operant response while simultaneously recording hundreds of neurons using Utah 79 arrays implanted in PMd and M1. We used decoding techniques to estimate single-80
trial DVs from PMd and M1 firing rates, and examined how the dynamics of these 81
decoded DVs changed with parameters such as stimulus difficulty and uncertainty 82 about expected stimulus duration. Our analyses focused on three interconnected 83 questions. 84 85
First, we analyzed the relationship between single-trial dynamics of the DV and 86 sensory stimuli that inform the choice, and determined whether these dynamics differ 87
between PMd and M1. We then tested whether the neural dynamics change when 88 subjects transition from a context of temporal certainty to high temporal uncertainty 89 about stimulus duration Newsome, 2001, Murphy et al., 2016) . 90 91
Second, we used computational modeling of behavior and neural responses to identify 92 mechanisms that can explain the observed dynamics of choice representation in PMd 93 and M1 under different task conditions. Bounded accumulation of evidence is a 94 widely used modeling framework for perceptual decisions in the direction 95 discrimination and similar sensory tasks (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2007) . For a binary 96 choice, the model assumes that two accumulators integrate sensory evidence in favor 97 of the two competing options until one of the accumulators reaches a decision 98 threshold or bound (Vickers, 1970 , Link, 1992 
Results

149
Monkeys discriminate stimulus motion better for higher coherence and longer 150 duration trials 151 152
We trained monkeys in a variant of the classical random dot motion discrimination 153 task (RDM, (Britten et al., 1992)), in which animals report the net direction of motion 154 in a random dot kinematogram Newsome, 2001, Kiani et al., 2008, 155 Britten et al., 1992) presented on a LCD touchscreen ( Fig. 1a ). In our variant of the 156 RDM task, the monkeys used an arm reach to one of two targets corresponding to the 157 perceived direction of motion to report their decision ( Fig. 1a-b ). In the fixed 158 duration version of the task the stimulus was always presented for 1000 ms followed 159 by a random delay period (400-900 ms) after which the monkey was provided with a 160 "go cue" to report its decision. Eye fixation was enforced from the beginning of the 161 trial until appearance of the go cue to impose additional behavioral control and avoid 162
interpretational confounds since PMd activity can be modulated by eye-hand relative 163 position (Pesaran et al., 2006) . 164 165
Monkeys displayed excellent behavioral performance in this task, achieving close to 166 ceiling levels of accuracy (99% for both monkeys) for the highest coherence stimuli 167 ( Fig. 1c, black After data collection was concluded in the fixed duration task, monkeys performed a 175 variable duration RDM task, ( Fig. 1c , red curves). In these experiments, stimulus 176 duration was randomly selected on each trial (200-1000 ms exponentially distributed, 177 median 435 ms) and the delay period was eliminated, requiring subjects to report their 178 decision immediately after stimulus offset. Psychophysical thresholds for both 179 monkeys decreased as stimulus duration increased up to ~500 msec ( Fig. 1d The two tasks enabled us to probe the dynamics of decision-related signals in 189
PMd/M1. The fixed duration task provided temporal separation between evidence 190 integration (dots period), action planning (hold period), and action execution (post-go 191 period). In contrast, the variable duration task provided the ability to query the 192 subject's choice as soon as the stimulus is terminated.
194
Single trial choice signals in PMd and M1 are compatible with the neural  195  representation of a decision variable  196  197 We recorded neural activity in PMd and M1, using two chronically implanted channel Utah arrays ( Fig. 1e ), while subjects performed each motion discrimination 199 task. Consistent with prior studies in PMd (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005, Chandrasekaran  200 et al., 2017), we found diverse responses at the single cell level, which may reflect 201 multiple functions being implemented in this area (Supp. Fig. 1 ). The same 202 observation was true for M1 (Supp. Fig. 2 ). 203 204
Our primary goal was to understand the dynamics of these diverse neural responses in 205
PMd and M1 at the population level-both on average and on single trials. We trained 206 a regularized logistic classifier to predict right and left choices on individual trials 207 based on short periods of neural activity (50 ms windows), using a method we 208 developed in a recent study (Kiani et al., 2014b . Although our monkeys were extensively trained on this version of the task 221 that allowed them 1000 msec to evaluate the stimulus motion and at least another 400 222 msec of delay period to prepare the operant response, both PMd and M1 still 223 responded in a choice predictive manner less than 250 ms after the stimulus onset and 224 over a second before the initiation of the action was cued. Thus, choice predictive 225 activity in these (pre)motor structures, similar to their parietal counterparts (Shadlen 226 and Newsome, 2001) is not contingent on having to prepare for immediate action, but 227
is also present when that action is delayed ~1-2 seconds into the future.
229
Choice prediction accuracy rose steadily for both areas as the trial proceeded, but was 230 significantly higher for PMd than for M1 (P<0.05 Wilcoxon Sign rank test, Holm-231
Bonferroni corrected) during most of the motion-viewing epoch ( Fig. 2a be even further increased by adjusting the window size Supp. Fig. 5 ), confirming the 241 possibility of obtaining single trial read-outs of a decision state from these areas. 242
243
Highly reliable choice predictive activity with short latencies is expected from 244 standard accumulation-to-bound models of decision formation (Mazurek, 2003 , Cisek 245 et al., 2009 ). The second expectation is that the rate of increase of choice predictive 246 activity should depend on stimulus difficulty (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) . Consistent 247 with this expectation, classification accuracy on easier trials rose faster and attained 248
higher values compared to harder trials ( Fig. 2b -c, Supp. Fig. 3b -c and 4b-c). This 249 feature was present in both areas though the separation between stimulus difficulties 250 was stronger in PMd than M1 between 200-600 ms aligned to stimulus onset 251
(Wilcoxon sign rank test, P<0.005, Supp. Fig. 6 ). The third expectation is that the 252 relationship between classification accuracy and motion coherence be stronger during 253
the first half of the dots period and becomes smaller as the trial unfolds ( To better understand the dynamics of decision-related activity, we calculated a 263 continuous readout of the strength of the model's prediction for the subject's choice, 264
which is critical for single trial analyses to follow. We calculated the logistic model's 265 log odds ratio for the two choices for each time point on every trial. This variable is 266 equal to the distance of the neural population activity from the classifying hyperplane 267 (Supp. Fig. 7a ). As in our previous study (Kiani et al., 2014b) , we interpreted this 268 distance as the model's decision variable (DV) and used it as a proxy for the internal 269 cognitive state of the animal, representing a preference for a given choice. Because 270 the DV is continuous (unlike predicted choice which is binary) and can differ even 271 between correctly predicted trials (Supp. Fig. 7a ), it provided a continuous metric for 272
quantifying the internal cognitive state and its dependency on stimulus difficulty. Our 273 convention was that positive values of the DV reflect increased likelihood of right 274 choices and negative values reflect left choices. As expected the average decision 275 variable showed the same effects found for choice prediction accuracy: (i) its 276 magnitude increases with time and with stimulus coherence (Supp. Fig. 7b To quantify stimulus coherence effects on the single-trial DV we focused on the first 291 half of the stimulus presentation interval (500 msec). This time window was 292 consistent with a conservative estimate of the motion integration times from 293 psychophysical data for both monkeys (Fig. 1d ). We used a tri-linear fit to single-trial 294 DV traces. The fitted function consisted of an initial interval of zero slope, reflecting 295 the finite latency between dots onset and initial modulation of PMd/M1 activity. The 296 slope during the second interval captures a period of rapid DV change following dots 297 onset, while the third interval reflects a general slowing of DV change that occurs by 298 the middle of the dots period (Supp. Fig. 7b-d , see Methods). The tri-linear fit enables 299 us to focus on the rate of rise of the DV during decision-making (Shadlen et al., 300 2016). Consistent with the ramping representation, at the population level, of a 301 decision variable on single trials in these areas, higher coherence trials are associated 302
with steeper DV slopes (second slope of the tri-linear fits, Figure 2d -e, Supp. Fig. 3d -303 e and Supp. Fig. 4d-e ). The results are significant for both areas and choice directions 304
(for both models: slope vs coherence and slope vs log 2 (coherence); see Methods, 305 statistical analyses Supp. Table 1 ).
307
Stimulus duration uncertainty increases and accelerates choice predictive 308 activity in both areas 309 310
So far, we focused on the neural activity from the fixed duration task for which the 311 animals consistently had 1 second of visual evidence to deliberate and decide upon. 312
However, in the real world, subjects rarely know the precise timing of visual 313 information relevant to making a choice. Thus, after experiments on the fixed 314 duration task, we introduced the variable duration task and trained the monkeys to 315 report their decision immediately upon termination of the stimulus ( Fig. 1a,b ; 316
Methods). Prior to these recordings the monkeys had never been exposed to short 317 duration stimuli (< 1000 ms).
319
Since subjects could not predict the duration of the stimulus on single trials and most 320 trials were short (median 435 ms, see Methods), the variable-duration task 321
incentivized accurate assessment of sensory evidence early in the stimulus 322 presentation period: the first 200 ms of dots motion were guaranteed to be shown but 323 stimulus presentation could be terminated at any point thereafter. We asked whether 324 the dynamics of decision-related signals in PMd and M1 were different in the variable 325 duration task. In both areas, we found that classification accuracy increased faster in 326 the variable duration task leading to much higher accuracy values during the stimulus 327 presentation period ( Fig. 3a , Supp. Fig. 8a , Supp. Fig. 9a ). This acceleration in 328 prediction accuracy was most apparent in M1, where choice predictive neural 329 responses emerged much faster in the variable duration task (193 ± 12 ms compared 330
to 240 ± 14 ms in the fixed duration task). This earlier onset also happened in PMd 331
(177 ± 8 ms compared to 187 ± 12 ms in the fixed duration task), though to a lesser 332 extent. Consequently, the difference in the onset time of choice-related activity 333
between PMd and M1 diminished substantially in the variable duration task (latency 334 difference= 13.2 ms in variable duration versus 41.6 ms in fixed duration task, p=1.6 335
x 10 -13 , Wilcoxon rank sum test). Moreover, the difference in absolute prediction 336 accuracy between the two areas was significant for only 80 ms during the entire dots 337 period (P<0.05 Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, Holm-Bonferroni corrected), confirming 338 that these areas represent the upcoming choice with very similar strength in the 339 variable duration task. 340 341
The slope analysis of single-trial DVs in the variable duration task showed that the 342 coherence effects were largely conserved on single trials in both PMd and M1 despite 343 the accelerated dynamics (dashed lines in Fig. 3b Fig 11) . The 345
DV slopes are overall larger for the variable duration task compared to the fixed 346 duration task (vertical shift between the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 3b -c, Supp. Fig.  347 8b-c, Supp. Fig. 9b -c). This difference was significant for all areas and target 348 directions (p<10 -18 , see Methods and Supp. For the fixed duration task, our prediction of RT from neural population data was 376 poor in the targets and dots epochs as expected from the task design ( Fig. 4 a-b ). Only 377 late in the delay period (~last 50 ms), when the monkey was presumably planning the 378 arm movement, did we observe a very small rise in RT variance explained by neural 379
activity. This rise became significant for both areas and targets within 60 ms after the 380 go cue (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p<0.01, Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple 381 comparisons). We observed a wide range of RTs in both tasks, which lead to a strong 382 dynamic range in firing rates that correlated with RT after the go cue and thus lead to 383 high R 2 values, which are expected for (pre)motor brain regions. Crucially, the results 384 for the variable duration task were similar in terms of temporal profile, with 385 significant R 2 values only present after the go cue but not during dots ( Fig. 4 c-d , 386
Supp. Figs 12 and 13 show model performance for example sessions). Repeating the 387 same analysis for hand peak velocity, we observed only modest R 2 values after the go 388 cue and around the time of the response for both tasks (Fig. 4 e-h ). The absence of 389 significant R 2 values during the stimulus presentation period in our two tasks ( Fig. 4  390 a-h) confirmed that hand motor signals were not contaminating our DV estimates.
392
Finally, and to rule out the contamination from additional variables associated with 393 the eye movement, we performed the same analyses on the analogous saccade 394 parameters: saccade RT and saccade peak velocity. Similar to our results for hand 395 movement kinematics, we could predict a significant fraction of variance of saccade 396
RT only during and following the go cue (but not before) (Supp. Fig. 14 a-d ). The R 2 397 peaks for saccade RTs were significantly lower than those for hand RTs (Fig. 4 a-d vs 398
Supp. Fig. 14 for all areas, tasks and target directions). Further, saccade peak velocity was not 400 explained by PMd or M1 neural data at any point in the trial (Supp. Fig. 14 e-h) . The 401
weaker representation of eye kinematics after Go cue is consistent with the expected 402
role of PMd and M1 in controlling arm movements. 403 404
In summary, our results showed that regardless of task timing, motor parameter 405
representation in PMd and M1 was reliable only around and after the go cue and not 406
while the visual evidence was presented. Thus, the accelerated dynamics of choice 407 predictive activity early in the stimulus presentation period of the variable duration 408 task was not due to a contamination by motor signals.
410
Progressive recruitment of choice selective neurons underlies accelerated 411 dynamics of the DV in the variable duration task 412 413
In the previous sections, we showed that the dynamics of choice related neural 414 activity on single trials is flexible, being strongly influenced by the expected statistics 415 of stimulus duration. In conventional evidence integration models of decision 416
formation (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2007 , Lo and Wang, 2006 , Mazurek, 2003 changes 417
in the dynamics of the DV are implemented through parameters that govern the 418 accumulation of sensory evidence. We tested whether these models could replicate 419 our observation that the DV buildup rates are higher in the variable duration task, and 420
that the size of the increase is independent of motion coherence. 421 422
We focused on a simple formulation of integration-to-bound models, in which two 423
competing 2009). Urgency is an evidence-independent signal that drives both integrators toward 437 their bounds. In principle, an overall increase of urgency in the variable-duration task 438
might mimic a coherence-independent increase in the DV buildup rates as observed in 439 the physiological data ( Fig. 3b ,c, vertical shift in DV slope vs. coherence traces) 440
through faster commitment to choice. However, because urgency affects both 441 accumulators, and the DV depends largely on the difference in the activity of our two 442 pools of neurons, the effect of urgency on the DV slope is small unless very large 443 urgency signals are imposed ( Fig. 5b , note that the cyan, red, and black data points are 444 almost completely superimposed in this figure) . A large urgency signal is 445 mathematically equivalent to a reduction in the decision bound and would lead to less 446 accurate choices and, consequently, to a sizeable increase in psychophysical 447 thresholds in the variable duration task (Fig. 5c ). Although the data of monkey F 448 provided some support for increased threshold, monkey H was incompatible with the 449
prediction of the urgency model (Supp. Fig. 15 ).
451
The sensory gain model builds on the proposal that later sensory evidence is 452
progressively amplified with a gain factor before integration ( was not a key factor. Similar to increased urgency, increased gain on sensory inputs 456 might lead to a coherence-independent increase in DV slope by accelerating bound 457
crossing and causing earlier commitment to choice. However, just as we showed for 458 the urgency signal, modest increases in gain do not generate a significant change in 459
the DV slopes as these largely depend on the difference between the accumulators, 460
both of which are affected by the increase in gain ( Fig. 5b , red data points are largely 461
superimposed on cyan and black). While large gains can increase the DV slope, they 462 also lead to reduced performance accuracy (Fig. 5d ) because the bound crossing is 463 accelerated and effective integration time is shortened, similar to what we observed 464
for the urgency signal above. The data from monkey H reduce the likelihood that the 465 urgency or sensory gain mechanisms are the only causes of the accelerated DVs in the 466 variable duration task. 467 468
Our third hypothesis proposes that the accelerated dynamics of the DV is due to 469 progressive recruitment of additional neural signals under conditions of temporal 470
uncertainty that represent choice outcome, which we term "categorical choice", but 471 not the accumulation of sensory evidence that leads to the choice. We postulate that 472 these categorical choice signals appear in each pool of accumulator neurons with 473 increasing frequency as each accumulator nears its bound (see below). In our 474 implementation, the strength of the categorical choice signal varies across single 475 neurons and is independent of the strength of the accumulated evidence signal in each 476
neuron (see Methods, ! values). In effect, the weighted contributions of these 477
neurons constitute a subspace of the neural population activity carrying coherence-478 independent choice signals. This "categorical choice subspace" would not contribute 479
to the formation of the decision but might be necessary for translating the output of 480 the integration process into preparation for a specific operant action. Hereafter, for 481 brevity, we'll refer to this subspace as the "choice subspace". 482 483
In principle, this choice subspace could be encoded by a population of dedicated 484 neurons that transition from an uncommitted state (baseline firing rate) to a 485 committed state for choice 1 or choice 2, with the transition becoming more probable 486
as each accumulator approaches its decision bound. We, however, favor the 487 alternative implemented in our simulations-the same neurons that represent 488
integration of evidence also represent the categorical choice. This mixed selectivity at 489
the level of single neurons leads to the representation of choice and evidence 490 accumulation in separable subspaces at the level of population responses. These two 491 methods for implementation of the categorical choice signal have similar 492 consequences for the behavior and calculated DVs, but the latter is more in line with 493 previous observations in frontal cortex (Mante et al., 2013) . 494 495
As suggested above, we simulated this mixed selectivity in a population of model 496 neurons whose responses were weighted sums of accumulated evidence and a 497 categorical choice signal (Methods, Integration Models). The choice signal was a 498
nonlinear monotonic function of the distance of the accumulated evidence from the 499 decision bound and can be thought of as a readout of the accumulation process in 500
preparation for commitment to a choice. We call this the progressive recruitment 501 model (PRM) for representation of choice signals. In the variable duration task, 502
acceleration of the choice signal enhances the representation of the upcoming choice 503 and boosts the model DV, leading to a coherence independent increase in DV slopes 504 (Fig. 5b , note that the magenta points are offset vertically from cyan, black and red). 505 506
PRM captures the behavioral data well because accelerated recruitment of coherence-507 independent choice signals does not cause perturbations in the underlying integration 508 process and does not change psychophysical performance (Fig. 5a ). Thus the PRM 509 neatly captures the key behavioral ( Fig. 5a ) and physiological data ( Fig. 5b) in 510 monkey H. In contrast to monkey H, psychophysical thresholds for monkey F 511 increased under conditions of temporal uncertainty, implying changes in the 512 underlying integration process (e.g., increased urgency or sensory gain). 513
Importantly, accelerated choice representation could happen simultaneously with 514 changes in the integration process that could cause an increased psychophysical 515 threshold for monkey F. Overall, our modeling results suggest that accelerated choice 516
representation, either in isolation or mixed with urgency or sensory gain, plays a key 517 role in enhanced response dynamics in PMd and M1 in the variable duration task.
519
The progressive recruitment model makes specific predictions at the population 520 and single unit levels 521 522
The PRM, as implemented in our simulations, makes specific, testable predictions 523 about the spatiotemporal features of the neural responses in both the fixed and 524 variable duration tasks. First, at the population level, the choice representing subspace 525
should be stable during a trial as more units are recruited to maintain a representation 526 of choice. Such stability facilitates decoding by downstream areas in the presence of 527 timing differences in our tasks. Second, this stabilization should happen faster in the 528 variable duration task due to the accelerated recruitment of choice representing 529
neurons. Third, the choice subspace in the population responses should be shared 530 across the two tasks. Fourth, at the single unit level we should observe the progressive 531 onset of choice representing units, some during the psychophysical integration 532 window ( Fig.1d ) and some only later in the trial. These units should have stable 533 choice preference (left or right) and stable or increasing choice modulation and their 534 recruitment should be accelerated in the variable duration task. 535 536
For simplicity in our simulations, we assumed no categorical choice representation in 537 the fixed duration task (Methods, Integration Models). Similar results would have 538
been obtained, however, if categorical choice signals were also recruited in this task 539 (a non-zero average ! parameter) as long as they remained substantially lower than in 540 the variable duration task. We expect this to be a more plausible scenario, and the 541 extent to which progressive recruitment is present in the fixed duration task can be 542 tested empirically. 543 544
In the following two sections we test these predictions first at the population level and 545 then at the single unit level. 546 547
Choice signal stabilizes during stimulus presentation in PMd and M1 548 549
To test our predictions, we started by examining the structure of the temporal 550
representation of choice across the entire trial. For each time point in each task we 551 defined a "choice axis" that best represents modulation of neural responses with 552 choice. Neurons with strong choice modulation at that time had a large weight in the 553 choice axis and neurons with smaller modulation had smaller weights (see Methods). 554
By comparing the similarity of choice axes at different times and in different tasks, 555
we could quantify the stability of choice-representation in the population. Fig. 6  556 shows the inner product of choice axes at different times. A large inner product 557
suggests good alignment of the choice axes and high stability of the choice-558
representing subspace. Conversely, a low inner product suggests a rotation in the 559 choice axis, which could happen if two different sub-populations of neurons represent 560 the choice at different times or if the relative contribution of neurons to the 561 representation of choice changes over time. Mathematically, the projection of a choice 562 axis on itself would be 1, making the diagonals uninformative. We therefore 563 calculated two choice axes for each point in time for two independent halves of each 564 session's data and measured the projection of these two axes onto each other (see 565
Methods). This way, the diagonal elements of the projection matrix were not set to 1 566 but instead provided a measure of self-consistency of the choice axis. Armed with 567 these stability and self-consistency metrics we investigated our model predictions.
569
Starting with PMd in the fixed duration task (Fig. 6a, Supp. Figs 16a and 17a ), we 570 observed three important features. First there was a gradual emergence, rotation and 571 stabilization of the choice axis (emergence of square structure in the heat map) that 572 started ~350 ms after dots onset and unfolded over the remainder of the dots 573 presentation. Second, the dots period was followed by a highly stable choice signal in 574 the delay period. Importantly, the choice axes late in the dots period were largely 575 overlapping with the choice axes early in the delay period (up until the go cue) 576
indicating that the representation of choice was largely maintained even in the 577 absence of additional visual evidence. Third, the choice signal around the initiation of 578 the reach, despite being extremely strong, was also very transient in its direction in 579 neural state space. These three main features were recapitulated for M1 ( Fig. 6b,  580 Supp. Figs 16b and 17b ), the main difference being the latency for stabilization of the 581 choice axis during the dots presentation, which happened faster for PMd (~350ms 582 after dots onset) compared to M1 (>500 ms after dots onset). The temporal ordering 583 between the two areas was consistent with our earlier analysis of choice predictive 584 activity in the fixed duration task (Fig. 2a ). These results are consistent with the first 585 prediction from the PRM regarding stability of the choice subspace during dots and 586 delay period. 587 588
For the variable duration task the rotation and stabilization of the choice axis 589
happened much faster (~250 ms after dots onset) than in the fixed duration task, 590 consistent with the second prediction of PRM. In the variable duration task, in fact, 591
the temporal stabilization of the choice axis was virtually indistinguishable between 592 PMd and M1 ( Fig. 6c-d, Supp. Figs 16c-d and 17c-d) . 593 594
The heat maps provide a qualitative description of stability of the choice subspace. 595
We quantified stability within and across epochs using decoding analyses (see 596
Methods). Our results show substantial choice representation stability within the 597 target, dots and pre-go epochs, but not the peri-movement epoch (Supp. Fig. 18 and  598  19 ). In addition, our results demonstrate choice representation stability across the dots 599 and pre-go epochs but not across other pairs of epochs (Supp. Fig. 20) . 600 601
Finally, our results also suggest a stable choice representation across tasks. Taking 602 advantage of sessions in which we recorded the same units in each brain area while 603 the monkey performed both tasks, we compared alignment of choice axes across time 604
and tasks ( Fig. 6e-f ). The choice axis measured in the stimulus presentation for the 605 variable duration task was largely consistent with choice axes at later times in the 606 fixed duration task (and vice versa), in agreement with the third prediction of the 607
PRM. This implies that the same transformation from integration of evidence to 608 stable choice signal occurs in the two tasks and is being carried out through the 609 recruitment of the same units, only at different rates that reflect the cognitive demands 610
imposed on the subject. 611 612
Stabilization of population choice axes occurs through progressive recruitment 613 of neurons with sustained choice modulation 614 615
We next examined the choice modulation at the single unit level to test the fourth 616 prediction of the PRM. This analysis provides a bridge between our population 617 analyses, modeling results, and single unit properties. We first calculated the 618 cumulative fraction of units that display significant choice modulation as stimulus 619 presentation progresses. Consistent with the PRM, the cumulative fraction rises much 620
faster over the course of stimulus presentation in the variable duration task (dashed 621 lines) compared to the fixed duration task (solid lines) for both PMd (Fig. 7a , Supp. 622 Fig. 21a and 22a ) and M1 (Fig. 7b, Supp. Fig. 21b and 22b ). 623 624
Further support for a mechanism of progressive recruitment came from persistent 625 activity of choice-selective neurons. We used area under the ROC (Shadlen and in the dots period or even during the delay period for both PMd (Fig. 7c ) and M1 (Fig.  636 7d) matches our expectation that progressive recruitment of choice signals is also 637 present in the fixed duration task. 638 639
Consistent with our logistic regression results, the emergence of persistent choice 640 representation in the individual units was faster and more widespread in PMd (Fig. 7c  641 Supp. Fig. 23a ) than M1 (Fig. 7d, Supp. Fig. 24b ) in the fixed duration task. 642
643
For a direct comparison across areas and tasks we also calculated the area under ROC 644 traces for sessions in which fixed and variable duration tasks were run in the same 645 experimental session (while putatively recording from the same units, see Methods).
646
The results show that for both areas (Fig. 7e-f , Supp. Fig. 24c-d) , units with stable 647 modulation were recruited earlier during the trial, and just as in the fixed duration 648 task, maintained their modulation strength until close to the time of the arm 649 movement. Not only did the same units represent choice in both areas during the 650 stimulus presentation period (Fig. 6e-f ), but also their recruitment ordering was 651 consistent across tasks for both areas (Spearman correlation between latencies across 652 tasks for PMD: rho = 0.869, p = 1.37x10 -11 and M1: rho = 0.579, p = 3.79x10 -5 for the 653 example session shown in Fig. 7e-f ), further suggesting that the same transformation 654 of signals is happening in both tasks at different rates. Finally, for the variable 655 duration task, just as in the logistic regression analysis (Fig. 3a) , the differences 656 between the two areas largely vanished in the variable duration task, both in terms of 657 fraction of significant units and rate of recruitment. Taken together these results 658
corroborate the fourth prediction from the PRM and show that temporal stability of 659 choice predictive signals inferred at the population mechanism is present at the level 660 of individual units as well. 661 662 663
Choice signal is distributed across the neural population 664 665
The stability of the choice axis over time (Figs. 6,7) suggests that there is little relay 666 of information between different ensembles of neurons (sequence mechanism: once the choice signal appears in the PMd and M1 populations. To further test 669
whether a sequence mechanism might be compatible with our results, we quantified 670 the distribution of choice-related neurons in the population as a function of time 671
during the trial. If the choice representation is generated by a sequence mechanism, 672 the neural representations at a given time during the trial should critically depend on a 673 small number of key neurons. Removing these neurons from the population should 674 result in a drastic degradation in the quality of the neural representations (Haxby et  675 al., 2001, Kiani et al., 2007) . We tested this possibility by performing a unit dropping 676 analysis that calculates how prediction accuracy is impacted by exclusion of the best 677
units (Kiani et al., 2015) . 678 679
We illustrate our results by focusing on two points in time: the end of the stimulus 680 presentation period (last 50 ms) and go cue presentation (50 ms before go), because a 681 strong choice related signal is present at these times in both tasks. Our results (Fig. 8a,  682 Supp. Fig. 24a and 25a) show that predictive accuracy decayed smoothly as the best 683 units were removed for both areas and both monkeys. We did not observe any 684
precipitous drop in prediction accuracy that might suggest a special role for a small 685 group of transiently active neurons. PMd remained more predictive than M1 at the 686 end of stimulus presentation (Fig. 8a, Supp. Fig. 24a and 25a ), as expected from 687 previous sections of this paper. This discrepancy vanished around the go cue. Also, in 688
the variable duration task the decay in performance was shallower (up to only ~10% 689
for the best 70 units) compared to the fixed duration task (Fig. 8b, Supp. Fig. 24b and  690 25b) due to the higher number of strongly tuned units (Fig. 7) . The key observation is 691 that representations in both areas and in both time points show remarkable robustness 692 to exclusion of the best predictive single units. Our neural population data are consistent with predictions of classic accumulation-to-717
bound models of the decision process. Specifically, choice predictive activity emerges 718 quickly after stimulus onset in both PMd and M1 and increases with time and 719 stimulus coherence as expected from evidence accumulation (integration) linked to 720 the sensory stimulus. Critically, our simultaneous population recordings provided 721 statistical power to test these predictions on single-trial activity as opposed to trial-722 averaged activity as in most previous studies. The build-up of choice predictive 723 activity on single trials-as captured in the rate-of-rise of the logistic decision 724
variable-varied systematically with stimulus coherence (Figs. 2d, Choice-predictive activity was present in both PMd and M1 even when action 730
initiation was cued more than one second after termination of the visual stimulus. The 731 most pronounced difference between the two areas occurred in the fixed duration 732 task: significant choice related activity emerged faster and was stronger in PMd 733 compared to M1 (Fig. 2b,c) This difference, however, essentially vanished in the variable duration task. Following 741 stimulus onset, prediction accuracy increased at nearly identical rates in the two areas 742 and plateaued at similarly high levels, the only difference being ~20 msec longer 743 latencies in M1 (Fig. 3a) . The dynamics accelerated in both areas under conditions of 744 temporal uncertainty, but the change was particularly dramatic in M1 (compare Fig.  745 2a with Fig. 3a) . These results could not be explained by displacement of motor 746 kinematic signals into the stimulus presentation period in the variable duration task 747 (Fig. 4) . Importantly, the accelerated dynamics were independent of the coherence of 748 the visual stimulus; the DV slope vs. coherence curves for the variable duration 749
condition are essentially vertically offset copies of those for the fixed duration 750
condition. 751 752
To our knowledge only one other study (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001 ) employed both 753
fixed and variable duration motion discrimination tasks while recording decision-754 related activity in individual units. Similar to the current study, the authors observed a 755 larger and faster average increase in choice modulation in LIP neurons in the variable 756 duration task, which they speculated could reflect increased urgency to make quicker 757 decisions when the duration of the sensory evidence is uncertain. While this intuition 758 is appealing, it begs the question as to the actual mechanism underlying the 759 accelerated dynamics, which we explored through a series of quantitative models. 760 761
Progressive recruitment of choice-selective neurons 762 763
The discovery of single-trial, coherence-independent acceleration of DV dynamics 764 under conditions of temporal uncertainty provides a useful new constraint on 765 mechanistic models of the decision process. Different variants of race models 766 between accumulation processes have long been proposed to explain both behavior 767 (Beck et al., 2008 , Link, 1992 , Vickers, 1970 , Wong and Wang, 2006 The analyses of choice axes suggested a stable representation of choice during the 785 dots and delay period. However, we found that the choice axis early in the dots period 786
(~250 ms after dots onset) does not perfectly overlap with choice axis late in the dots 787 period (~750 ms after dots onset). Through our simulations, we posited that changes 788
in the choice axis between the early and late epochs of the dots period occur due to 789 the recruitment of signals associated with the categorical choice in addition to signals 790 associated with the accumulation of evidence. Similarly, but to a much larger degree, 791
the choice axis during the actual arm movement did not overlap with the choice axis 792 from the dots period, probably reflecting the additional recruitment of signals 793 associated with moving the arm. We believe that the shift in the choice axis across 794 epochs is evidence for the existence of multiple choice subspaces in PMd/M1 (and 795 other brain regions) that are engaged at different epochs in the tasks presented here 796
(and for other tasks). In this study, we have exposed one aspect of these choice 797
subspaces. Multiple choice subspaces will likely reflect the different behavioral 798 demands for the monkey at different points in the task such as sensory evidence 799 evaluation, motor preparation, movement execution, post-movement evaluation, 800
reward expectation, and learning. Reorganization of neural activity into different 801
subspaces has been previously observed in PMd for delayed reach tasks between the 802 movement preparation and execution phases (Elsayed et al., 2016) and is compatible 803
with the low projection between peri-movement and delay period axes we obtained in 804 the fixed duration task (Figure 6a ). 805 806
We also observed a difference in latency for choice representation to become stable 807
between PMd and M1, and these latency differences depended on the task. For the 808 variable duration task, the latencies for stabilization of the choice representation in 809
both PMd and M1 were well within the estimated psychophysical integration 810 windows for both monkeys (500-600 msec- Fig. 1d ). In contrast, M1 data in the 811 fixed duration task appear to stabilize at ~750 msec ( Fig. 6b) , well outside the 812 psychophysical integration window. Thus, the M1 delay can be highly variable 813
depending on the expected time for the execution of motor action. In the variable-814 duration task, where the Go cue can happen any time, M1 responses reflect the choice 815 much earlier. Note that similar progressive recruitment of the choice representing 816 subspace in M1 and PMd would lead to similar reduction of latency in the two areas. 817
Therefore, it is unlikely that a common input to the two areas underlies our results. 818
An appealing hypothesis is that changes of latency in M1 are caused by changes of 819
PMd dynamics. If the choice representation in PMd should reach a threshold level 820 before it emerges in M1, the accelerated choice representation in PMd would cause 821
both accelerated dynamics and significantly reduced latency of choice representation 822 in M1 in the variable duration task. Overall, our results hint at a mechanism where 823 PMd responses lead and furnish the choice representation in M1. 824 825 826
Progressive recruitment accounts better for our data than a sequence hypothesis 827 828
Our results suggest that progressive recruitment of units with temporally stable choice 829 modulation is a plausible mechanism for choice representation in PMd and M1. In 830 contrast, evidence from recent optical imaging studies in rodents (Harvey et al., 2012, 831 Morcos and Harvey, 2016) suggests an alternative mechanism: representation of 832 choice by transient ensembles of neurons that are activated sequentially as the trial 833
proceeds, effectively passing choice information from one ensemble to the next 834 throughout a trial. Intrigued by this finding in rodents, we analyzed our neural 835 population data to test the predictions of these two mechanisms on individual sessions 836 in monkeys. Our analyses of the temporal stability of choice axes, within and across 837 epoch decoding, and unit dropping all support a stable choice representation 838 mechanism over a sequence mechanism. Our failure to detect sequences during the 839 visual stimulus and delay periods does not reflect a problem with our analysis 840 techniques; sequences of ensemble activity were strikingly present in the peri-841 movement interval for the operant arm movement, as shown by the diagonal structure 842 is carried by a large (and growing) fraction of neurons (Fig. 7a,b) and their 848 modulation is largely stable over the stimulus presentation and pre-go cue period 849
(ROC analyses, Fig. 7c,d) . 850 851
The pronounced difference between stable choice representation in the primate cortex 852
and sequential representation in the rodent cortex might simply reflect a species 853 difference in neural mechanisms underlying choice behavior. However, a recent 854 study of choice mechanisms in rodents supports stable accumulation of evidence in 855 parietal cortex (Hanks et al., 2015) . The key difference between the latter study and 856 those that yielded evidence for sequences is that animals were actively locomoting on 857 a track ball when sequences were observed. A more recent-and as yet not peer 858
reviewed-study suggests that sequences of neuronal activity during track ball 859 locomotion result not from choice-related signals per se, but from specific 860 combinations of bodily position and head angle at successive times during locomotion 861 (Krumin et al., 2017) . Our best reading of the current literature is that the evidence for 862 stable representations of choice in primate cortex is strong, whereas the sequence 863 hypothesis that has emerged from rodent work requires further study to confirm, 864 refine, or reject. Developing behavioral tasks that are as similar as possible for 865 monkeys and rodents may help resolve some of these issues. 866 867
Concluding remarks 868 869
We have focused on single trial estimation of decision variables in neural population 870
data and development of mechanistic models that explain both the behavioral and 871 physiological data. Like many studies in the contemporary literature, our comparison 872 of models to data relies on regression analyses that produce vectors of weights on the 873 responses of individual units, be they neurons or voxels. Importantly, we do not 874 assert that a downstream brain area or deeper cortical layer (Chandrasekaran et al., 875 2017) actually performs a linear weighting of PMd/M1 activity in superficial layers to 876 guide decisions. For present purposes, we simply use the DV as a proxy for the 877 informational content about choice present at any given moment in these neural 878
populations (Kiani et al., 2014b) . Recordings across multiple brain regions and 879 precise knowledge of projection pathways between them will be required to elucidate 880 the actual mechanisms that transform this information to signals that trigger an action. 881 882
More broadly, our study integrates a small but growing body of literature that 883
leverages All authors contributed extensively to the conceptualization of the study, the 915 experimental design and choice of methods for data analysis. D.P. trained animals, 916 performed all electrophysiological experiments, collected and analyzed data. D.P., 917 R.K. and W.T.N. wrote initial draft of the paper. S.I.R, D.P and R.K. performed the 918 surgical procedures. All authors contributed analytical insights and commented on 919 statistical tests, discussed the results and implications, and contributed extensively to 920 the multiple subsequent drafts of the paper. 921 922 923 appear on the screen. The motion stimulus was shown after a short delay (500 ms) 1676
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and lasted 1000 ms (200-1000 ms) for the fixed (variable) duration version. The dots 1677 offset was followed by a 400-900 ms delay in the fixed duration version whereas no 1678 delay was present for variable duration version. At the end of the delay, the offset of 1679 the fixation point cued the monkey to report his decision by making a hand reach 1680 movement to the appropriate target. 1681 c) Psychophysical performance in the motion discrimination task. Percentage 1682
correct is plotted as a function of motion coherence for the fixed duration version 1683
(black) and the variable duration task (red) for monkey H (left panel) and monkey F 1684 
